OpenSSH key management, Part 31. Agent forwarding and keychain improvements Many of us use the excellent OpenSSH as a secure, encrypted replacement for the venerable telnet and rsh commands. One of OpenSSH's more intriguing features is its ability to authenticate users using the RSA and DSA authentication protocols, which are based on a pair of complementary numerical "keys." One of the main appeals of RSA and DSA authentication is the promise of being able to establish connections to remote systems without supplying a password. For more background, see the previous installments of this series on OpenSSH key management, which cover RSA/DSA authentication (Part 1) and ssh-agent and keychain (Part 2), respectively. Since Part 2 was published on developerWorks in September 2001, and later referenced on Slashdot and Freshmeat (see Resources later in this article for links to these sites), a lot of people have started using keychain, and it's undergone a lot of changes. I've received approximately 20 or so high-quality patches from developers around the world. I've incorporated many of these patches into the keychain source, which is now at version 1.8 (see Resources). I send my sincere thanks to all those who submitted patches, bug reports, feature requests, and notes of appreciation. In my last article, I've spent some time discussing the security benefits and tradeoffs of running ssh-agent. A few days after the second article appeared on developerWorks, I received an e-mail from Charles Karney of Sarnoff Corporation, who politely informed me of OpenSSH's new authentication agent forwarding abilities, which we'll take a look at in a bit. In addition, Charles emphasized that running ssh-agent on untrusted machines is quite dangerous: if someone manages to get root access on the system, then your decrypted keys can be extracted from ssh-agent. Even though extracting the keys would be somewhat difficult, it is within the skill of professional crackers. And the mere fact that private key theft is possible means that we should take steps to guard against it happening in the first place. To formulate a strategy to protect our private keys, we must first put the machines we access into one of two categories. If a particular host is well-secured or isolated -- making successful root exploit against it quite unlikely -- then that machine should be considered a trusted host. If, however, a machine is used by many other people or you have some doubts about the security of the system, then the machine should be considered an untrusted host. To guard your private keys against extraction, ssh-agent (and thus keychain) should never be run on an untrusted host. That way, even if the system's security is compromised, there will be no ssh-agent around for the intruder to extract keys from in the first place. However, this creates a problem. If you can't run ssh-agent on untrusted hosts, then how do you establish secure, passwordless ssh connections from these systems? The answer is to only use ssh-agent and keychain on trusted hosts, and to use OpenSSH's new authentication forwarding abilities to extend passwordless authentication to any untrusted hosts. In a nutshell, authentication forwarding works by allowing remote ssh sessions to contact an ssh-agent running on a trusted system. Authentication agent forwarding To get an idea of how authentication forwarding works, let's first take a look at a hypothetical situation where user drobbins has a trusted laptop called lappy, a trusted server called trustbox, and two other untrusted systems that he must access, called notrust1 and notrust2, respectively. Currently, he uses ssh-agent along with keychain on all four machines, as follows:
The problem with this approach is that if someone gains root access on notrust1 or notrust2, then it is of course possible for this person to extract keys from the now vulnerable ssh-agent process. To fix this, drobbins stops running ssh-agent and keychain on untrusted hosts notrust1 and notrust2. In fact, to be even more careful, drobbins decides to only use ssh-agent and keychain on lappy. This limits exposure of his decrypted private keys, protecting him against private key theft:
Of course, the problem with this approach is that drobbins can now only establish passwordless connections from lappy. Let's see how to enable authentication forwarding and get around this problem. Assuming that all machines are running recent versions of OpenSSH, we can get around this problem by using authentication forwarding. Authentication forwarding allows remote ssh processes to contact the ssh-agent that is running on your local trusted machine -- rather than requiring a version of ssh-agent to be running on the same machine that you are sshing out from. This usually allows you to run ssh-agent (and keychain) on a single machine, and means that all ssh connections that originate (either directly or indirectly) from this machine will use your local ssh-agent. To enable authentication forwarding, we add the following line to lappy and trustbox's /etc/ssh/ssh_config. Note that this is the config file for ssh (ssh_config), not the ssh daemon sshd (sshd_config):
Now, to take advantage of authentication forwarding, drobbins can connect from lappy to trustbox, and then from trustbox to notrust1 without supplying passphrases for any of the connections. Both ssh processes "tap in" to the ssh-agent running on lappy:
If you try a similar configuration and find that agent forwarding isn't working, try using ssh -A instead of plain old ssh to explicitly enable authentication forwarding. Here's a diagram of what went on behind the scenes when we logged in to trustbox and notrust1 using authentication forwarding, above:
As you can see, when ssh connected to trustbox, it maintained a connection to the ssh-agent running on lappy. When an ssh connection was made from trustbox to notrust1, this new ssh process maintained the authentication connection to the previous ssh, effectively extending the chain. Whether this authentication chain can be extended beyond notrust1 to other hosts depends on how notrust1's /etc/ssh/ssh_config is configured. As long as agent forwarding is enabled, all parts of the chain will be able to authenticate using the ssh-agent running on the trusted lappy. Advantages of agent connection forwarding Authentication forwarding offers a number of security advantages not touched on here. To convince me of the importance of agent connection forwarding, Charles Karney shared with me these three security advantages:
The one drawback to relying on authentication agent connection forwarding is that it doesn't solve the problem of allowing cron jobs to take advantage of RSA/DSA authentication. One solution to this problem is to set up all cron jobs that need RSA/DSA authentication so that they execute from a trusted machine on your LAN. If necessary, these cron jobs can use ssh to connect to remote systems to automate backups, synchronize files, and so on. Now that we've looked at authentication agent connection forwarding, let's turn to recent improvements made to the keychain script itself. Keychain functionality improvements Thanks to user patch submissions, many significant improvements have been made to the keychain source. Several of the user-submitted keychain patches were functionality-related. For example, you'll recall that keychain created an ~/.ssh-agent file; the name of this file has now been changed to ~/.ssh-agent-[hostname] so that keychain works with NFS-mounted home directories that may be accessed from several different physical hosts. In addition to the ~/.ssh-agent-[hostname] file, there is now a ~/.ssh-agent-csh-[hostname] file that can be sourced by csh-compatible shells. Finally, a new --nocolor option has been added so that colorization features can be disabled if you happen to be using a non-vt100-compatible terminal. While the functionality improvements have been significant, the vast majority of fixes have dealt with shell compatibility issues. You see, while keychain 1.0 required bash, later versions were changed to work with any sh-compatible shell. This change allows keychain to work "out of the box" on nearly any UNIX system, including Linux, BSD, Solaris, IRIX, and AIX as well as other UNIX platforms. While the transition to sh and general UNIX compatibility has been a bumpy ride, it has also been a tremendous learning experience. Creating a single script that runs on all of these platforms has been very tricky indeed, mainly because I simply don't have access to most of these operating systems! Thankfully, keychain users from around the globe do, and many have provided great assistance in identifying compatibility problems and submitting patches to fix them. There are really two kinds of compatibility problems that had to be fixed. First, I needed to make sure that keychain only used built-ins, expressions, and operators that were fully supported under all sh implementations, including all the popular free and commercial UNIX sh shells, zsh (in sh-compatibility mode), and bash versions 1 and 2. Here are some of the user-submitted shell-compatibility fixes that were applied to the keychain source: Since older sh shells don't support the ~ convention to refer to a user's home directory, lines that used ~ were changed to use $HOME instead:
Next, all references to source were changed to . to ensure compatibility with purist NetBSD's /bin/sh, which doesn't support the source command at all:
Along the way, I also applied some nice performance-related fixes. One savvy shell scripter informed me that instead of "touching" a file by typing touch foo, you can do this instead:
By relying on built-in shell syntax rather than using an external binary, a fork() is avoided and the script becomes slightly more efficient. The > foo should work with any sh-compatible shell; however, it does not appear to be supported by ash. This shouldn't be a problem for most people, since ash is more of an emergency-disk type shell rather than something people use on a day-to-day basis. Getting a script working under multiple UNIX operating systems requires more than adhering to pure sh syntax. Remember, most scripts also call external commands, such as grep, awk, ps, and others, and these commands must be called in a standards-compliant way as much as possible. For example, while the echo included with most versions of UNIX recognizes the -e option, Solaris does not -- it simply prints a -e to stdout when it is used. So in order to deal with Solaris, keychain now auto-detects whether echo -e works:
Above, E is set to -e if -e escaping is supported. Then, echo can be called as follows:
By using echo $E instead of echo -e, the -e option can be dynamically enabled or disabled as needed. Probably the most significant compatibility fix involved changing how keychain detects currently running ssh-agent processes. Previously, I was using the pidof command to do this, but it had to be removed since several systems don't have a pidof. Really, pidof isn't the greatest solution anyway since it lists all ssh-agent processes running on the system, regardless of user, when we're really interested in all ssh-agent processes owned by the current effective UID. So, instead of relying on pidof, we switched over to piping ps output to grep and awk in order to extract the needed process ids. This was a user-submitted fix:
The above pipeline will set the mypids variable to the values of all ssh-agent processes owned by the current user. The grep -v grep command is part of the pipeline to ensure that the grep ssh-agent process does not become part of our PID list. While this approach is good in concept, using ps opened up a whole new can of worms since ps options are not standardized across various BSD and System V UNIX derivatives. Here's an example: while ps uxw works under Linux, it does not work under IRIX. And while ps -u username -f works under Linux, IRIX, and Solaris, it doesn't work under BSD, which only understands BSD-style ps options. To get around this problem, keychain auto-detects whether the current system's ps works with BSD or System V syntax before executing the ps pipeline:
To ensure that we work with both System V and BSD-style ps commands, the script does a "dry run" of ps uxw, throwing away any output. If the error code from this command is zero, we know that ps uxw works and we set the psopts value appropriately. However, if ps uxw returned a non-zero error code (indicating that we need to use BSD-style options), we do a dry-run of ps -u `whoami` -f, again throwing away all output. At this point, hopefully we've found either a BSD or System V variant of ps that we can use. If we haven't, we print out an error and exit. But it is very likely that one of the two ps commands worked, in which case we execute the final line in the above code snippet, our ps pipeline. By using the $psopts variable expansion immediately after ps, we're able to pass the correct options to the ps command. The ps pipeline also contains a true grep gem, which was kindly sent to me by Hans Peter Verne. Notice that grep -v grep is no longer part of the pipeline; instead, it has been removed and grep "ssh-agent" has been changed to grep "[s]sh-agent". This single grep command ends up doing the same thing as grep ssh-agent | grep -v grep; can you figure out why?
Stumped? If you've decided that a grep "ssh-agent" and grep "[s]sh-agent" should match the exact same lines of text, you are correct. So why do they generate different results when the output of ps is piped to them? Here's how it works: when you use grep "[s]sh-agent", you change how the grep command appears in the ps process list. By doing so, you prevent grep from matching itself, since the [s]sh-agent string doesn't match the [s]sh-agent regular expression. Isn't that brilliant? If you still don't get it, play around with grep a bit more and you'll get it soon enough. This column concludes my coverage of OpenSSH. Hopefully, you've learned enough about it to start using OpenSSH to secure your systems. Next month's Common threads column will continue with the "Advanced filesystem implementor's guide" series.
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