openMosixview: Insecure temporary file creation

1. Gentoo Linux Security Advisory

Advisory Reference	GLSA 200504-20 / openMosixview
Release Date	April 21, 2005
Latest Revision	April 21, 2005: 01
Impact	normal
Exploitable	local

Package	Vulnerable versions	Unaffected versions	Architecture(s)
sys-cluster/openmosixview	< 1.5-r1	>= 1.5-r1	All supported architectures

Related bugreports: #86686

Synopsis

openMosixview and the openMosixcollector daemon are vulnerable to symlink attacks, potentially allowing a local user to overwrite arbitrary files.

2. Impact Information

Background

The openMosixview package contains several tools used to manage openMosix clusters, including openMosixview (the main monitoring and administration application) and openMosixcollector (a daemon collecting cluster and node information).

Description

Gangstuck and Psirac from Rexotec discovered that openMosixview insecurely creates several temporary files with predictable filenames.

Impact

A local attacker could create symbolic links in the temporary files directory, pointing to a valid file somewhere on the filesystem. When openMosixView or the openMosixcollector daemon runs, this would result in the file being overwritten with the rights of the user running the utility, which could be the root user.

3. Resolution Information

Workaround

There is no known workaround at this time.

Resolution

All openMosixview users should upgrade to the latest version:

Code Listing 3.1: Resolution

# emerge --sync
# emerge --ask --oneshot --verbose ">=sys-cluster/openmosixview-1.5-r1"

4. References

CAN-2005-0894

Page updated April 21, 2005

Summary: This is a Gentoo Linux Security Advisory

Security Team
Contact Address

Donate to support our development efforts.