GLEP 74: Full-tree verification using Manifest files
|Author||Michał Górny <email@example.com>, Robin Hugh Johnson <firstname.lastname@example.org>, Ulrich Müller <email@example.com>|
|Posting history||2017-10-26, 2017-11-16|
|Replaces||44 58 60|
- Manifest file format
- Manifest file locations and nesting
- Directory tree coverage
- Path and filename encoding
- File verification
- Timestamp verification
- Modern Manifest tags
- Deprecated Manifest tags
- Algorithm for full-tree verification
- Algorithm for finding parent Manifests
- Checksum algorithms (informational)
- Manifest compression
- Combining multiple Manifest trees (informational)
- Package manager integration (informational)
- An example Manifest file (informational)
- Stand-alone format
- Tree design
- Tree layout restrictions
- Filename character set restriction
- File verification model
- Non-strict Manifest verification
- Timestamp field
- New vs deprecated tags
- Finding top-level Manifest
- Injecting ChangeLogs into the checkout
- Splitting distfile checksums from file checksums
- Hash algorithms
- Manifest compression
- Performance considerations
- Backwards Compatibility
- Reference Implementation
This GLEP extends the Manifest file format to cover full-tree file integrity and authenticity checks. The format aims to be future-proof, efficient and provide means of backwards compatibility.
The Manifest files as defined by GLEP 44  provide the current means of verifying the integrity of distfiles and package files in Gentoo. Combined with OpenPGP signatures, they provide means to ensure the authenticity of the covered files. However, as noted in GLEP 57  they lack the ability to provide full-tree authenticity verification as they do not cover any files outside the package directory. In particular, they provide multiple ways for a third party to inject malicious code into the ebuild environment.
Historically, the topic of providing authenticity coverage for the whole repository has been mentioned multiple times. The most noteworthy effort are GLEPs 58  and 60  by Robin H. Johnson from 2008. They were accepted by the Council in 2010 but have never been implemented. When potential implementation work started in 2017, a new discussion about the specification arose. It prompted the creation of a competing GLEP that would provide a redesigned alternative to the old GLEPs.
This specification is designed with the following goals in mind:
- It should provide means to ensure the authenticity of the complete repository, including preventing the injection of additional files.
- The format should be universal enough to work both for the Gentoo repository and third-party repositories of different characteristics.
- The Manifest files should be verifiable stand-alone, that is without knowing any details about the underlying repository format.
This specification reuses and extends the Manifest file format defined in GLEP 44 . For the purpose of it, the file type field is repurposed as a generic tag that could also indicate additional (non-checksum) metadata. Appropriately, those tags can be followed by other space-separated values.
Unless specified otherwise, the paths used in the Manifest files are relative to the directory containing the Manifest file. The paths must not reference the parent directory (..). Forward slash (/) is used as path component separator.
The Manifest files use UTF-8 encoding.
The Manifest file located in the root directory of the repository is called top-level Manifest, and it is used to perform the full-tree verification. In order to verify the authenticity, it must be signed using OpenPGP, using the armored cleartext format.
The top-level Manifest may reference sub-Manifests contained in subdirectories of the repository. The sub-Manifests are traditionally named Manifest; however, the implementation must support arbitrary names, including the possibility of multiple (split) Manifests for a single directory. The sub-Manifest can only cover the files inside the directory tree where it resides.
The sub-Manifest can also be signed using OpenPGP armored cleartext format. However, the signature verification can be omitted since it already is covered by the signed top-level Manifest.
The specification provides three ways of skipping Manifest verification of specific files and directories (recursively):
- explicit IGNORE entries in Manifest files,
- injected ignore paths via package manager configuration,
- using names starting with a dot (.) which are always skipped.
All files that are not ignored must be covered by at least one of the Manifests.
A single file may be matched by multiple identical or equivalent Manifest entries, if and only if the entries have the same semantics, specify the same size and the checksums common to both entries match. It is an error for a single file to be matched by multiple entries of different semantics, file size or checksum values. It is an error to specify another entry for a file that matches IGNORE, or that is located inside an ignored directory.
The file entries (except for IGNORE) can be specified for regular files only. Symbolic links are followed when opening files and traversing directories. It is an error to specify an entry for a different file type. If the tree contain files of other types that are not otherwise ignored, they need to be covered by an explicit IGNORE.
All the local (non-DIST) files covered by a Manifest tree must reside on the same filesystem. It is an error to specify entries applying to files on another filesystem. If files or directories that are not otherwise ignored reside on a different filesystem, or symbolic links point to targets on a different filesystem, they must be explicitly excluded via IGNORE.
The path fields in the Manifest file must consist of Unicode characters excluding the backwards slash (\) and characters classified as control characters or as whitespace in the current version of the Unicode standard .
The implementation can optionally support extended filename encoding to support those paths. If encoding is not supported, the implementation must reject directories containing any files using non-compliant names, as well as Manifest files whose filename field contains such filenames.
If encoding is supported, then all of the excluded characters that are present in paths must be encoded using one of the following escape sequences:
- characters in the U+0000 to U+007F range can be encoded as \xHH where HH specifies the zero-padded, hexadecimal character code,
- characters in the U+0000 to U+FFFF range can be encoded as \uHHHH where HHHH specifies the zero-padded, hexadecimal character code,
- characters in the UCS-4 range can be encoded as \UHHHHHHHH where HHHHHHHH specifies the zero-padded, hexadecimal character code.
It is invalid for the backwards slash to be used in any other context, and a backwards slash present in filename must be encoded. A backwards slash used as a path component separator should be replaced by a forward slash instead.
The encoding can be used for other characters as well. In particular, escaping non-printable characters might be desirable.
When verifying a file against the Manifest, the following rules are used:
- If the file is covered directly or indirectly by an entry of the IGNORE type, the verification always succeeds.
- If the file is covered by an entry of the MANIFEST, DATA,
MISC, EBUILD or AUX type:
- if the file is not present, then the verification fails,
- if the file is present but has a different size or one of the checksums does not match, the verification fails,
- otherwise, the verification succeeds.
- If the file is present but not listed in Manifest, the verification fails.
Unless specified otherwise, the package manager must not allow using any files for which the verification failed. The package manager may reject any package or even the whole repository if it may refer to files for which the verification failed.
The top-level Manifest file can contain a TIMESTAMP entry to account for attacks against tree update distribution. If such an entry is present, it should be updated every time at least one of the Manifests changes. Every unique timestamp value must correspond to a single tree state.
During the verification process, the client should compare the timestamp against the update time obtained from a local clock or a trusted time source. If the comparison result indicates that the Manifest at the time of receiving was already significantly outdated, the client should either fail the verification or require manual confirmation from the user.
Furthermore, the Manifest provider may employ additional methods of distributing the timestamps of recently generated Manifests using a secure channel from a trusted source for exact comparison. The exact details of such a solution are outside the scope of this specification.
TIMESTAMP entries may also be present in sub-Manifests. Those timestamps must not be newer than the timestamp of the top-level Manifest (if present). This specification does not define any specific use for them.
In order to perform full-tree verification, the following algorithm can be used:
- Collect all files present in the repository into present set.
- Start at the top-level Manifest file. Verify its OpenPGP signature. Optionally verify the TIMESTAMP entry if present as specified in timestamp verification. Remove the top-level Manifest from the present set.
- Process all MANIFEST entries, recursively. Verify the Manifest files according to the file verification section, and include their entries in the current Manifest entry list (using paths relative to directories containing the Manifests).
- Process all IGNORE entries. Remove any paths matching them from the present set.
- Collect all files covered by DATA, MISC, EBUILD and AUX entries into the covered set.
- Verify the entries in the covered set for incompatible duplicates and collisions with ignored files as explained in Manifest file locations and nesting.
- Verify all the files in the union of the present and covered sets, according to the file verification section.
In order to find the top-level Manifest from the current directory the following algorithm can be used:
- Store the current directory as original and the device ID of the containing filesystem (st_dev) as startdev,
- If the device ID of the containing filesystem (st_dev) of the current directory is different than startdev, stop.
- If the current directory contains a Manifest file:
- If an IGNORE entry in the Manifest file covers the original directory (or one of the parent directories), stop.
- Otherwise, store the current directory as last_found.
- If the current directory is the root system directory (/), stop.
- Otherwise, enter the parent directory and jump to step 2.
Once the algorithm stops, last_found will contain the relevant top-level Manifest. If last_found is null, then the directory tree does not contain any valid top-level Manifest candidates and one should be created in the original directory.
Once the top-level Manifest is found, its MANIFEST entries should be used to find any sub-Manifests below the top-level Manifest, up to and including the original directory. Note that those sub-Manifests can use different filenames than Manifest.
This section is informational only. Specifying the exact set of supported algorithms is outside the scope of this specification.
The algorithm names reserved at the time of writing are:
- MD5 ,
- RMD160 -- RIPEMD-160 ,
- SHA1 ,
- SHA256 and SHA512 -- SHA-2 family of hashes ,
- WHIRLPOOL ,
- BLAKE2B and BLAKE2S -- BLAKE2 family of hashes ,
- SHA3_256 and SHA3_512 -- SHA-3 family of hashes ,
- STREEBOG256 and STREEBOG512 -- Streebog family of hashes .
The method of introducing new hashes is defined by GLEP 59 . It is recommended that any new hashes are named after the Python hashlib module algorithm names, transformed into uppercase.
The topic of Manifest file compression is covered by GLEP 61 . This section merely addresses interoperability issues between Manifest compression and this specification.
The compressed Manifest files are required to be suffixed for their compression algorithm. This suffix should be used to recognize the compression and decompress Manifests transparently. The exact list of algorithms and their corresponding suffixes are outside the scope of this specification.
The top-level Manifest file must not be compressed. Since the OpenPGP signature covers the uncompressed text and is compressed itself, the data would have to be decompressed without any prior verification. This could expose users e.g. to zip bombs or exploits on decompressor vulnerabilities.
Whenever this specification refers to sub-Manifests, they can use any names but are also required to use a specific compression suffix. The MANIFEST entries are required to specify the full name including compression suffix, and the verification is performed on the compressed file.
The specification permits uncompressed Manifests to exist alongside their compressed counterparts, and multiple compressed formats to coexist. If that is the case, the files must have the same uncompressed content and the specification is free to choose either of the files using the same base name.
This specification permits nesting multiple hierarchical Manifest trees. In this layout, the specific directories of the Manifest tree can be verified both as a part of another top-level Manifest, and as an independent Manifest tree (when obtained without the parent directory).
For this to work, the sub-Manifest file in the directory must also satisfy the requirements for the top-level Manifest file. That is:
- it must be named Manifest and not compressed,
- it must cover all the files in this directory and its subdirectories (i.e. no files from the directory tree can be covered by parent Manifest),
- if authenticity verification is desired, it must be OpenPGP-signed.
It should be noted that if such a directory is a subdirectory of a valid Manifest tree, the sub-Manifest needs to be valid according to the top-level Manifest and the OpenPGP signature is disregarded as detailed in Manifest file locations and nesting. The top-level behavior is exhibited only when the directory is obtained without parent directories.
A package manager supporting full-tree Manifest verification should enable it by default when using the Gentoo repository via rsync, and require every location affecting its operation to verify successfully before using it.
Full-tree verification can only be disabled explicitly by the user (e.g. using configuration files). For security reasons, the package manager must not ever attempt to disable it based on any data from the repository. In particular, it is wrong to control it via metadata/layout.conf or based on the presence of top-level Manifest, as it allows a malicious third-party to easily bypass verification.
Furthermore, none of the files present in the repository can be processed before being verified against the Manifest files. This includes metadata/layout.conf and profiles/repo_name files. If the top-level Manifest is not present or those files do not pass verification, the package manager with full-tree verification enabled must reject the repository immediately.
An example top-level Manifest file for the Gentoo repository would have the following content:
TIMESTAMP 2017-10-30T10:11:12Z IGNORE distfiles IGNORE local IGNORE lost+found IGNORE packages MANIFEST app-accessibility/Manifest 14821 SHA256 1b5f.. SHA512 f7eb.. ... MANIFEST eclass/Manifest.gz 50812 SHA256 8c55.. SHA512 2915.. ...
An example modern Manifest (disregarding backwards compatibility) for a package directory would have the following content:
DATA SphinxTrain-0.9.1-r1.ebuild 932 SHA256 3d3b.. SHA512 be4d.. DATA SphinxTrain-1.0.8.ebuild 912 SHA256 f681.. SHA512 0749.. DATA metadata.xml 664 SHA256 97c6.. SHA512 1175.. DATA files/gcc.patch 816 SHA256 b56e.. SHA512 2468.. DATA files/gcc34.patch 333 SHA256 c107.. SHA512 9919.. DIST SphinxTrain-0.9.1-beta.tar.gz 469617 SHA256 c1a4.. SHA512 1b33.. DIST sphinxtrain-1.0.8.tar.gz 8925803 SHA256 548e.. SHA512 465d..
The first question that needed to be asked before proceeding with the design was whether the Manifest file format was supposed to be stand-alone, or tightly bound to the repository format.
The stand-alone format has been selected because of its three advantages:
- It is more future-proof. If an incompatible change to the repository format is introduced, only developers need to upgrade the tools they use to generate the Manifests. The tools used to verify the updated Manifests will continue to work.
- It is more flexible and universal. With a dedicated tool, the Manifest files can be used to sign and verify arbitrary file sets.
- It keeps the verification tool simpler. In particular, we can easily write an independent verification tool that could work on any distribution without needing to depend on a package manager implementation or rewrite parts of it.
Designing a stand-alone format requires that the Manifest carries enough information to perform the verification following all the rules specific to the Gentoo repository.
The second important point of the design was determining whether the Manifest files should be structured hierarchically, or independent. Both options have their advantages.
In the hierarchical model, each sub-Manifest file is covered by a higher level Manifest. As a result, only the top-level Manifest has to be OpenPGP-signed, and subsequent Manifests need to be only verified by checksum stored in the parent Manifest. This has the following implications:
- Verifying any set of files in the repository requires using checksums from the most relevant Manifests and the parent Manifests.
- The OpenPGP signature of the top-level Manifest needs to be verified only once per process.
- Altering any set of files requires updating the relevant Manifests, and their parent Manifests up to the top-level Manifest, and signing the last one.
- As a result, the top-level Manifest changes on every commit, and various middle-level Manifests change (and need to be transferred) frequently.
In the independent model, each sub-Manifest file is independent of the parent Manifests. As a result, each of them needs to be signed and verified independently. However, the parent Manifests still need to list sub-Manifests (albeit without verification data) in order to detect removal or replacement of subdirectories. This has the following implications:
- Verifying any set of files in the repository requires using checksums and verifying signatures of the most relevant Manifest files.
- Altering any set of files requires updating the relevant Manifests and signing them again.
- Parent Manifests are updated only when Manifests are added or removed from subdirectories. As a result, they change infrequently.
While both models have their advantages, the hierarchical model was selected because it reduces the number of OpenPGP operations (which are comparatively costly) to the minimum.
The algorithm is meant to work primarily with ebuild repositories which normally contain only files and directories. Directories provide no useful metadata for verification, and specifying special entries for additional file types is purposeless. Therefore, the specification is restricted to dealing with regular files.
The Gentoo repository does not use symbolic links. Some Gentoo repositories do, however. To provide a simple solution for dealing with symlinks without having to take care to implement special handling for them, the common behavior of implicitly resolving them is used. Therefore, symbolic links to files are stored as if they were regular files, and symbolic links to directories are followed as if they were regular directories.
Dotfiles are implicitly ignored as that is a common notion used in software written for POSIX systems. All other filenames require explicit IGNORE lines.
An ability to inject additional ignore entries is provided to account for site configuration affecting the repository tree -- placing additional files in it, skipping some of the categories from syncing. This configuration can extend beyond the limits of this GLEP, e.g. by allowing wildcards or regular expressions.
The algorithm is restricted to work on a single filesystem. This is mostly relevant when scanning for top-level Manifest -- we do not want to cross filesystem boundaries then. However, to ensure consistent bidirectional behavior we need to also ban them when operating downwards the tree.
The directories and files on different filesystems need to be ignored explicitly as implicitly skipping them would cause confusion. In particular, tools might then claim that a file does not exist when it clearly does because it was skipped due to filesystem boundaries.
The valid set of filename characters for the Gentoo repository is restricted by the devmanual 'File Naming Rules' section , and enforced via a git hook. The valid distfile names are not restricted explicitly -- however, the PMS dependency specification syntax  implicitly makes it impossible to use filenames containing whitespace.
This specification aims to avoid arbitrary restrictions. For this reason, filename characters are only restricted by excluding three technically problematic groups:
- The backwards slash character (\) is used as path separator on Windows systems, so it's extremely unlikely to be used in real filenames. For this reason it is used to implement character encoding with minimal risk of breaking backwards compatibility.
- The control characters can trigger special behavior in various programs and confuse them from recognizing text files. In particular, the NULL character (U+0000) is normally used to indicate the end of a null-terminated string. Its use could therefore break implementations written in the C language. Other control characters could trigger various formatting routines, garbling text output.
- Whitespace characters are used to separate Manifest fields and entries. While technically it would be enough to restrict space (U+0020) character that is normally used as the separator and newline (U+000A) character that is used to separate lines, all whitespace characters are forbidden to avoid confusion and implementation errors.
Historically, Portage attempted to overcome the whitespace limitation by attempting to locate the size field and take everything before it as filename. This was terribly fragile and even if it worked, it would solve the problem only partially.
To preserve compatibility with the current implementations and given that all of the listed characters are not allowed for the foreseeable Gentoo uses, extended encoding support is optional. If such support is not provided, the implementation must unconditionally reject any such files. Ignoring them implicitly would be confusing, and it is not possible to use them in explicit IGNORE entries.
The character encoding method provides means to overcome the character restrictions to extend the tool usability beyond immediate Gentoo uses. The backslash escape form based on Python unicode strings is used since it can encode all characters within the Unicode range, the syntax is familiar to many programmers and the backwards slash character is extremely unlikely to appear in real filenames.
Syntax is limited to the minimum necessary to implement the encoding. Shorthand forms (e.g. \t or \\) are omitted to avoid unnecessary complexity, and to reduce the risk of shell users using backslash to escape space directly. The \x form is limited to \x00..\x7F range to avoid ambiguity of higher values which might be interpreted either as UCS-2 code points or part of a UTF-8 encoded character.
Encoding stores UCS-2/UCS-4 characters directly rather than hex-encoded UTF-8 string to simplify the implementation. In particular, it makes it possible to process the Manifest file as UTF-8 encoded text without having to perform additional UTF-8 decoding (and verification) of the escaped data.
URL-encoding was considered as an alternative. However, it could collide with DIST entries that are implicitly named after the URL filename part where URL-encoding is pretty common.
The verification model aims to provide full coverage against different forms of attack. In particular, three different kinds of manipulation are considered:
- Alteration of the file content.
- Removal of a file.
- Addition of a new file.
In order to prevent against all three, the system requires that all files in the repository are listed in Manifests and verified against them.
As a special case, ignores are allowed to account for directories that are not part of the repository but were traditionally placed inside it. Those directories were distfiles, local and packages. It could be also used to ignore VCS directories such as CVS.
Originally the Manifest2 format provided a special MISC tag that was used for metadata.xml and ChangeLog files. This tag indicated that the Manifest verification failures could be ignored for those files unless the package manager was working in strict mode.
The first versions of this specification continued the use of this tag. However, after a long debate it was decided to deprecate it along with the non-strict behavior, and require all files to strictly match.
Two arguments were mentioned for the usefulness of a MISC type:
- being able to reduce the checkout size by stripping unnecessary files out, and
- being able to update automatically generated files locally without causing unnecessary verification failures.
However, the usefulness of MISC in both cases is doubtful.
The cases for stripping unnecessary files mostly focused around space savings. For this purpose, stripping metadata.xml and similar files has little value. It is much more common for users to strip whole packages or categories. The MISC type is not suitable for that, and so a dedicated package manager mechanism needs to be developed instead. The same mechanism can also handle files that historically used the MISC type. As an example, the package manager may choose to generate both the rsync exclusion list and Manifest ignore list using a single source list.
The cases for autogenerated files involve such cache files as use.local.desc. However, we can not include md5-cache there due to security concerns which results in inconsistent cache handling. Furthermore, the tools were historically modified to provide stable output which means that their content can not change without a non-MISC content being changed first. This practically defeats the purpose of using MISC.
Finally, the non-strict mode could be used as means to an attack. The allowance of missing or modified documentation file could be used to spread misinformation, resulting in bad decisions made by the user. A modified file could also be used, e.g. to exploit vulnerabilities of an XML parser.
The top-level Manifest optionally allows using a TIMESTAMP tag to include a generation timestamp in the Manifest. A similar feature was originally proposed in GLEP 58 .
A malicious third-party may use the principles of exclusion or replay  to deny an update to clients, while at the same time recording the identity of clients to attack. The timestamp field can be used to detect that.
In order to provide more complete protection, the Gentoo Infrastructure should provide an ability to obtain the timestamps of all Manifests from a recent timeframe over a secure channel from a trusted source for comparison.
Strictly speaking, this information is provided by the various metadata/timestamp* files that are already present. However, including the value in the Manifest itself has a little cost and provides the ability to perform the verification stand-alone.
Furthermore, some of the timestamp files are added very late in the distribution process, past the Manifest generation phase. Those files will most likely receive IGNORE entries and therefore be unsafe to use.
The specification permits additional timestamps in sub-Manifest files for local use. A generic testing tool should ignore them.
The development of a reference implementation for this GLEP has brought the following problem: how to find all the relevant Manifests when the Manifest tool is run inside a subdirectory of the repository?
One of the options would be to provide a bi-directional linking of Manifests via a PARENT tag. However, that would not solve the problem when a new Manifest file is being created.
Instead, an algorithm for iterating over parent directories is proposed. Since there is no obligatory explicit indicator for the top-level Manifest, the algorithm assumes that the top-level Manifest is the highest Manifest in the directory hierarchy that can cover the current directory. This generally makes sense since the Manifest files are required to provide coverage for all subdirectories, so all Manifests starting from that one need to be updated.
If independent Manifest trees are nested in the directory structure, then an IGNORE entry needs to be used to separate them.
Since sub-Manifests can use any filenames, the Manifest finding algorithm must not short-cut the procedure by storing all Manifest files along the parent directories. Instead, it needs to retrace the relevant sub-Manifest files along MANIFEST entries in the top-level Manifest.
One of the problems considered in the new Manifest format was injecting historical and autogenerated ChangeLog into the repository. We normally don't include those files, to reduce the checkout size. However, some users have shown interest in them and Infra is working on providing them via an additional rsync module.
If such files were injected into the repository, they would cause verification failures of Manifests. To account for this, Infra could provide IGNORE entries to allow them to exist.
Another problem with the current Manifest format is that the checksums for fetched files are combined with checksums for local files in a single file inside the package directory. It has been specifically pointed out that:
- since distfiles are sometimes reused across different packages, the repeating checksums are redundant .
- mirror admins were interested in the possibility of verifying all the distfiles with a single tool.
This specification does not provide a clean solution to this problem. It technically permits moving DIST entries to higher-level Manifests but the usefulness of such a solution is doubtful.
However, for the second problem we will probably deliver a dedicated tool working with this Manifest format.
While maintaining a consistent supported hash set is important for interoperability, it is not a good fit for the generic layout of this GLEP. Furthermore, it would require updating the GLEP in the future every time the used algorithms change.
Instead, the specification focuses on listing the currently used algorithm names for interoperability, and sets a recommendation for consistent naming of algorithms in the future. The Python hashlib module is used as a reference since it is used as the provider of hash functions for most of the Python software, including Portage and PkgCore.
The basic rules for changing hash algorithms are defined in GLEP 59 . The implementations can focus only on those algorithms that are actually used or planned on being used. It may be feasible to devise a new GLEP that specifies the currently used hashes (or update GLEP 59 accordingly).
The support for Manifest compression is introduced with minimal changes to the file format. The MANIFEST entries are required to provide the real (compressed) file path for compatibility with other file entries and to avoid confusion.
The compression of top-level Manifest file has been prohibited as the specification currently does not provide any means of verifying the file prior to decompression. If the top-level Manifest is compressed, tooling will have to unpack the file before being able to verify the contents. This makes it possible for a malicious third party to attack the system by providing a compressed Manifest that exposes decompressor vulnerabilities, or a zip bomb.
The OpenPGP cleartext signature covers the contents of the Manifest, and is therefore compressed along with them. The possibility of using a detached signature has been considered but it was rejected as unnecessary complexity for minor gain.
Technically, a similar result could be effected via moving all the data into a compressed sub-Manifest in the top directory (e.g. Manifest.sub.gz), and including a MANIFEST entry for this file in a signed, uncompressed top-level Manifest.
The existence of additional entries for uncompressed Manifest checksums was debated. However, plain entries for the uncompressed file would be confusing if only the compressed file existed, and conflicting if both uncompressed and compressed variants existed. Furthermore, it has been pointed out that DIST entries do not have an uncompressed variant either.
Performing a full-tree verification on every sync raises some performance concerns for end-user systems. The initial testing has shown that a cold-cache verification on a btrfs file system can take up around 4 minutes, with the process being mostly I/O bound. On the other hand, it can be expected that the verification will be performed directly after syncing, taking advantage of a warm filesystem cache.
To improve speed on I/O and/or CPU-restrained systems even further, the algorithms can be easily extended to perform incremental verification. Given that rsync does not preserve mtimes by default, the tool can take advantage of mtime and Manifest comparisons to recheck only the parts of the repository that have changed.
Furthermore, the package manager implementations can restrict checking only to the parts of the repository that are actually being used.
This GLEP provides optional means of preserving backwards compatibility. To preserve the backwards compatibility, the following needs to hold for the Manifest file in every package directory:
- all files must be covered by the single Manifest file,
- all distfiles used by the package must be included,
- all files inside the files/ subdirectory need to use the AUX tag (rather than DATA),
- all .ebuild files need to use the EBUILD tag,
- the metadata.xml and ChangeLog files need to use the MISC tag,
- the Manifest can be signed to provide authenticity verification,
- an uncompressed Manifest must always exist, and a compressed Manifest of identical content may be present.
Once the backwards compatibility is no longer a concern, the above no longer needs to hold and the deprecated tags can be removed.
The reference implementation for this GLEP is being developed as the gemato project .
Thanks to all the people whose contributions were invaluable to the creation of this GLEP. This includes but is not limited to:
- Robin Hugh Johnson,
- Ulrich Müller.
Additionally, thanks to Robin Hugh Johnson for the original MetaManifest GLEP series which served both as inspiration and source of many concepts used in this GLEP. Recursively, also thanks to all the people who contributed to the original GLEPs.
|||(1, 2) GLEP 44: Manifest2 format (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0044.html)|
|||GLEP 57: Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Overview (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0057.html)|
|||(1, 2) GLEP 58: Security of distribution of Gentoo software - Infrastructure to User distribution - MetaManifest (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0058.html)|
|||(1, 2) GLEP 59: Manifest2 hash policies and security implications (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0059.html)|
|||GLEP 60: Manifest2 filetypes (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0060.html)|
|||GLEP 61: Manifest2 compression (https://www.gentoo.org/glep/glep-0061.html)|
|||The Unicode standard (https://unicode.org/versions/latest/)|
|||(1, 2) Package Manager Specification: Dependency Specification Format - SRC_URI (https://projects.gentoo.org/pms/6/pms.html#x1-940008.2.10)|
|||Ebuild File Format -- Gentoo Development Guide (https://devmanual.gentoo.org/ebuild-writing/file-format/#file-naming-rules)|
|||RFC1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm (https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1321.txt)|
|||The hash function RIPEMD-160 (https://homes.esat.kuleuven.be/~bosselae/ripemd160.html)|
|||(1, 2) FIPS PUB 180-4: Secure Hash Standard (SHS) (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf)|
|||The WHIRLPOOL Hash Function (http://www.larc.usp.br/~pbarreto/WhirlpoolPage.html)|
|||BLAKE2 -- fast secure hashing (https://blake2.net/)|
|||FIPS PUB 202: SHA-3 Standard: Permutation-Based Hash and Extendable-Output Functions (http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.202.pdf)|
|||GOST R 34.11-2012: Streebog Hash Function (https://www.streebog.net/)|
|||Cappos, J et al. (2008). "Attacks on Package Managers" (https://www2.cs.arizona.edu/stork/packagemanagersecurity/attacks-on-package-managers.html)|
|||According to Robin H. Johnson, 8.4% of all DIST entries at the time of writing are duplicate, representing 2 MiB out of 25 MiB of DIST entries altogether.|
|||gemato: Gentoo Manifest Tool (https://github.com/mgorny/gemato/)|